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Federal Pay-for-Performance Reform and Organizational 
Discrimination: Lessons, Impacts, and Guidance for the Future 
 
Executive Summary 
 Those closest to the field of public administration, either through scholarly or practitioner 
roles, know very well that pay systems within the federal governm nt are in dire need of new 
ideas. The General Schedule was established 60 years ago with the passage of the Classification 
Act of 1949. Since that time, the federal pay system has done quite well in establishing internal 
fairness and equality for workers within its purview. Starting in the 1970s, however, the General 
Schedule has fallen under increasing criticism for its failure to provide federal workers with an 
incentive to do better work or take on more demanding levels of responsibility.  
 Recent federal efforts to reform human capital management and increase organizational 
performance have attempted to connect strategic goals with employee performance objectives. 
Reforming or replacing the General Schedule has been deemed an ancillary, yet crucial, step in 
this process. The plans, as carried out, typically provide top performers in federal agencies with 
bonuses in addition to their base pay. A variety of test programs have been authorized and 
executed to evaluate the efficacy of these programs.  
 Academic research suggests that the type of pay scheme implemented by an organization 
can have many unintended impacts. The General Schedule is an internally rigid system that 
reduces subjectivity in employee evaluations, but it does this by acrificing rewards for high 
achievers. Pay-for-performance systems respond well to the accomplish ents of hard workers, 
but also introduce a larger degree of subjectivity into the system by providing monetary rewards 
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based on supervisory evaluations. If this subjectivity is not properly controlled, it could result in 
increased levels of discrimination within the organization. 
 When the Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation (No 
FEAR) Act of 2002 was passed, it required federal agencies to collect data on discrimination 
complaints within each agency on a yearly basis. These data, once c llected, must be published 
in all agencies’ websites. Complaint activity is broken down in these reports based on total 
numbers of complaints, the basis of complaints, complaints actually resulting in a finding of 
discrimination, the processing time of complaints, and many more categories. The data create a 
very detailed view of each agency’s discrimination levels and provide a useful medium for 
analyzing the impacts pay-for-performance reforms have within an agency.  
 The purpose of this study is to identify and describe any discriminatory impacts pay-for-
performance reforms might cause within public organizations. This research identified three 
particular programs, those carried out by Government Accountability Office, Securities and 
Exchange Commission, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, for evaluation. These 
agencies were chosen due to their similarities. All three instituted their pay system reforms at a 
similar point in time, have comparable numbers of employees, and are independent federal 
agencies. These organizations make up the experimental group of thisresearch. Controlling for 
size and type of agency reinforces the validity of the results in that they are not subject to 
unpredictable influences resulting from the variations. 
Nine other agencies were selected as a control group against which the experimental 
group was compared. No agencies in the control group have implemented pay-for- erformance 
reforms. However, they do retain the other common similarities of the experimental group. The 
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control group was comprised of other independent federal agencies with at least 1,000 
employees.  
By utilizing time series analyses and independent samples t-tests to examine the EEOC 
data provided by the agencies, the study found no connection between pay-for- erformance 
reforms and discrimination. Three hypotheses were tested that led the research to this conclusion. 
First, it was hypothesized that the control group would have a lower rat  of discrimination 
complaints than the experimental group. Next, the research anticipated that the post-intervention 
totals for the experimental group would be higher than the pre-interveion totals. Lastly, SEC 
was predicted to have a significantly lower incident rate of discrimination reporting than FDIC or 
GAO due to its strict internal review process. In all cases, the s atistical analysis returned results 
that showed no significant difference between the variables. Therefor, all three hypotheses were 
rejected and it was determined that pay-for-performance reforms had no discernable impact on 
organizational discrimination levels.  
The time series analysis did provide interesting insight into employee reactions to the 
policy introduction. For each agency in the experimental group, the year immediately following 
the reforms displayed a marked increase in discrimination complaints. Within a few years of the 
initial introduction of the reforms, complaint activity had returned to levels similar to what was 
observed prior to the policy intervention. This trend seems to indicate a linkage between pay-for-
performance reform and the initial perception of discrimination among employees. Actual 
findings of discrimination did not increase during this time and complaint levels, so no 
connection can be made between the pay system changes and discrimination. 
Future administrators considering implementing adjustments or reforms to their existing 
pay structures may wish to carefully consider the impacts such changes have on their workers. 
v 
 
Having one’s pay altered or being passed over for a bonus is not easily taken by most, and 
without understanding the new system, many employees may find it to be discriminatory in 
nature. This study concludes that while continual consideration should always be given to the 
discriminatory impacts new policies may have on employees, prudent public managers should 
educate their subordinates on the specifics of new pay systems before they are introduced. 
Communication with employees and the consideration of feedback and suggestions from them 
occur on a continual basis. This recursive cycle will ultimately lead to plans that attract a wider 
base of support, facilitate compromise between staff and managers, nd reduce the amount of 
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Federal Pay-for-Performance Reform and Organizational 
Discrimination: Lessons, Impacts, and Guidance for the Future 
 
Introduction 
Upon entering office, each new president will undoubtedly face the issu  of federal 
government reform. The topic is inherently related to the responsibilities and duties each 
president fulfills. President Roosevelt rapidly expanded the size and purview of the federal 
government during the 1930s and 1940s, firmly establishing a model of government similar to 
what is still present today. This expansion of the federal government generated a new interest in 
analyzing public sector productivity. Not only has the efficiency and efficacy of the federal 
government come under increasing scrutiny since the New Deal, but so too have those who work 
within it. Academics, advocacy groups, and even various agencies within the federal government 
have all created plans to increase federal employees’ productivity and efficiency.  
Recent presidents have attempted to confront these issues in efforts to update and 
revolutionize the administrative world. President Ronald Reagan implement d the policy of 
devolution, where the administration of many public programs and funding of personnel systems 
was relegated to the states. This, it was believed, would reduce bureaucracy and increase 
responsiveness. President Clinton focused on quality management. He launched the National 
Performance Review, headed by Vice President Gore, to identify areas and ideas where 
government could be streamlined and made more efficient (Breul and K mensky, 2008). Most 
recently, President Bush applied private sector approaches to federal agencies through his 
Management Agenda (U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2002). The new mphasis under 
President Bush’s plan focused on strengthening accountability and organizational performance 
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rather than radically reforming hierarchy or shifting power. President Bush’s new agenda 
effectively revitalized a decades-old discussion about civil service reform and the proper use of 
merit and performance-based incentives (Breul and Kamensky, 2008). 
Systems that remunerate employees based on individual or group performance, better 
known as pay-for-performance systems, are commonly found in the private sector. These types 
of schemes reward workers with a predetermined amount of money for ach measurement of 
success completed satisfactorily. Even though this type of system i  used widely outside of 
government, it still signals a radical shift in the pay paradigm commonly held by most federal 
workers. The success rate of such reforms in the public sector has been mixed, and scholars have 
found evidence in support of and against performance-based pay systems in government 
agencies.  
Most of the literature published on this topic as it relates to public agencies has focused 
on evaluating the efficacy and promising nature of these reforms. Variables such as efficiency, 
effectiveness, productivity, and quality of work have all been examined in detail. Very few 
researchers have focused on the unforeseen impacts of these reforms, h wever. This research 
examines whether performance-based pay systems have any impact on the amount of 
discrimination within an agency. Existing theory suggests that making such changes will cause a 
change in the level of organizational discrimination. It is not only re evant but also vitally 
important to research these issues as government takes on the task of modernizing the federal 
service. 
The General Schedule System currently covers about 70 percent of all federal employees 
and does well to establish a culture of fairness and equality within agencies. Despite this positive 
aspect of the system, it has received increasing levels of criticism throughout recent decades. 
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Scholars and civil servants have decried it as being outdated and inefficient. They claim that its 
restrictive and rigid properties prevent government from acquiring and retaining the critical 
talent it needs to run well. To confront these challenges, alterntives for replacing the General 
Schedule System, such as performance-based systems, have been offered by many experts in the 
field. Again, it is very important to consider the unforeseen effects that might be caused as a 
result of changes in remuneration systems as government attempts to update itself and challenge 
the underlying assumptions of older models.  
Congress and the Office of Personnel Management have been eager to allow independent 
agencies to pursue their own pay schedules and plans in recent years. It is hoped that this 
experimentation will allow government to test the ability of new systems to bring about the 
changes people are looking for. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Government Accountability Office (GAO) have all received 
authorization from one or both of the aforementioned bodies to implement performance-based 
reforms in their pay systems. GAO has been particularly influential i  the recent push for federal 
reform, authoring numerous reports that detail the successes of current changes and advocate 
heavily for more expansive performance-based improvements across a broader range of federal 
agencies. 
Using EEOC data collected and published as a requirement of the Notificati n and 
Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation (No FEAR) ct of 2002, a comparison 
will be carried out between three agencies that have implemented performance-based pay 
changes and nine other independent agencies that have not. By contrasting the levels of 
discrimination claims and findings between the two groups, a picture should emerge detailing the 
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exact impact the changes had on workplace discrimination within the agencies. This research 
examines the discrimination complaint levels within each organization.  
Assessing whether performance-based pay systems cause a change in the amount of 
discrimination experienced within agencies is vital to the discussion of government reform. The 
movement for finding an alternative to the General Schedule System i  spreading. As this 
exploration continues and the tendency to adopt such reforms gains popularity among agencies 
and departments, understanding the underlying discriminatory effects, if any should exist, is 
absolutely essential to forming a better system. The new system must implement accountability 
and performance initiatives in a way that aligns well with the principles of fairness and equity.  
 
Describing the Pay Systems 
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 implemented major initiatives to motivate civil 
service employees by rewarding high achievers. By establishing t e merit system, which allows 
federal agencies to provide incentives and rewards to the hardest working employees, it was 
assumed these principles would lead to a revitalized and more productive civil service. 
Unfortunately, the federal merit system has been largely ineffective sinc its inception to produce 
major productivity benefits. Federal employees have traditionally had a difficult time linking pay 
to performance under the system (Pearce and Perry, 1983). Over the decad s, the merit system 
has become more of an insulating feature of federal employment, which keeps political pressures 
from whimsically affecting workers’ future, rather than an impetus for increased productivity. 
The Office of Personnel Management was tasked with the oversight and administratio  of 
the General Schedule after the passage of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Under this 
system, individual employees receive yearly increases in pay based on their particular level of 
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employment, also known as a step. Seniority, or time spent within an organization, tends to be 
the predominant factor for promotions and increases in pay, not performance. Most employees 
are eligible for advancing to the next grade level after a cert in amount of time, usually one year. 
Each grade in the General Schedule corresponds to a classification regarding the type of work 
being performed by the individual. As such, grades within the General Schedule usually relate 
more to an employee’s rank within the hierarchy of an organization than the market value of his 
or her skills (Milakovich and Gordon, 2004, 304-315). 
There are many benefits of this General Schedule System, however. For example, 
employees covered under the General Schedule must rarely worry ab ut their yearly increase in 
pay, as it is prescribed and set into law by Congress. The system i  internally fair and embodies 
the philosophy of “equal pay for equal work.” The classification system also allows for 
employees to transfer easily between agencies, as their job, grade level, and specific step held 
relate directly to their positions in the previous agencies’ hierarchy. As Kim (1988, 109) 
observed, “merit pay includes the element of scientism, which emphasizes objectivity and 
accuracy in placing workers in appropriate positions and rewarding them with appropriate pay.” 
Not all observers see a need to reform the federal service, and some completely denounce the 
current movement of market-based reforms. Claims exist that such reforms are incompatible 
with the nature of government service and that “the performance paradigm compromises the 
capacity of the civil servant to act according to public service ideals” (Thompson, 2006, 498). 
The Government Accountability Office has been one of the most vocifer us proponents 
of federal strategic performance reforms. As such, it is of little surprise that the agency has 
undertaken one of the most extensive initiatives within the federal government to reform its 
compensation system. GAO implemented a policy to band its pay levelsand adjust them to more 
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accurately reflect market trends for employees in the same positions or with the same education 
levels and skills. The system became most noteworthy in 2005 after the passage of the GAO 
Human Capital Reform Act of 2004. The agency continuously reevaluates and adjusts its pay 
scales to ensure continued reflection of private sector offerings. Using a tiered system, GAO 
ranks employees’ performance on five levels. The total compensation for performance-based 
salary adjustments is determined by calculating the percentage of salaries within each band. The 
organization does not use a pooling or review board technique in evaluating employ e 
performance audits. In FY 2006, GAO gave an average adjustment of 2.6 percent to those 
employees who received a satisfactory evaluation (U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2007, 
23; U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007; Walker, 2007). 
In 2002, the Securities and Exchange Commission executed its own pay-for-performance 
system. The system initially assesses the individual performance of an employee in a binary 
fashion, labeling performance as either acceptable or unacceptable. The second part of the 
process allows employees and supervisors to submit written statements highlighting the findings 
of the evaluation. Once this is done, the supervisors place the respective employee into one of 
four categories. A committee devoted to the review of this process then assesses th  comments of 
both the supervisor and employee and the category the employee was placed in by the 
supervisor. The final evaluation is retained by the committee, who will place the employee into a 
step from 0 – 3. This placement reflects the actual amount of bonus pay the individual employee 
will receive (U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2007, 29; U.S. Securiti s and Exchange 
Commission, 2008). 
The FDIC also has a performance-based pay system originating in 1998. The most recent 
and significant changes occurred in 2003, however, when the reforms began to impact lower-
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level staff. There are two separate systems covering all emp oyees, one for senior managers and 
another for all bargaining unit and non-bargaining unit personnel, within the agency. Increases in 
pay are closely tied to individual contributions to organizational goals. After an employee 
receives a satisfactory evaluation, he or she is placed into one of four pools of employees who 
performed similarly well. Performance-based bonuses are awarded aft r the individual is 
compared to other peers in the same pool (U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2007, 27). 
To illustrate the pay-for-performance systems further: if a carpenter gets paid $100 for 
every new chair s/he makes, a policy analyst at GAO might get put into the next highest category 
for bonuses each time s/he contributes directly and unambiguously to the agency’s strategic 
goals. To continue the analogy, if the carpenter makes no chairs, s/he gets no pay. If an employee 
at GAO, FDIC, or SEC does not meet expectations for the year, s/he receives no bonus or 
increase in pay.  
By understanding the differences between the individual systems and the General 
Schedule, several disparate approaches to federal pay emerge. The General Schedule is a system 
based on longevity within civil service and does very little to promote productivity. Merit pay 
was originally thought of as a way to encourage federal employees to work harder by adding 
incentives to their routines. Ultimately, this did very little to influence or inspire civil servants. 
Performance-based pay systems are the latest attempt at increasing government efficiency by 
directly linking pay to performance and the closest scheme white-collar federal employees have 





 Pay-for-Performance systems are rooted in expectancy theory and reinforcement theory 
(Perry, Engbers, and Jun, 2009). Taken together, they provide a foundation and explanation for 
why performance-based systems work. Each framework provides an explanation for how 
incentives in the remuneration schemes compel employees to work harder and create better 
work. Keeping the discussion relevant to this research, discrimination, if shown to exist in the 
data, would undermine both theories and remove the incentivizing factors for employees within 
the performance-based systems. 
Expectancy theory ties effort to outcome. If an employee believes that exerting more 
effort or performing better in a particular way within a job will attract more rewards, and the 
employee values those rewards, then s/he will work harder in order to obtain the rewards 
(Vroom, 1964). It has also been shown that individuals will attempt to optimize their situations 
by comparing the immediate choices available rather than holding each choice to an independent 
standard. This process is a display of an individual’s attempt to maximize personal outcome and 
reward (Behling and Starke 1973). When discrimination is observable and rampant, this 
comparison might encourage employees to quickly assess their situation and seek out new 
agencies or sectors for work. These theories show that discrimination could undermine the ability 
for performance-based reforms to create the desired changes. 
  If expectancy theory can be summarized as compelling one to choose to perform better, 
then reinforcement theory can be thought of as training for an individual to do so.  That is, 
reinforcement theory places importance on the current act (typically performance) and the 
consequences (positive or negative) of that act. Over time, pay can reinforce good behaviors 
(high performance) and lead to a more productive workforce. For performance-based systems, 
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the opportunity for bonuses continually motivates and trains an employee t  work hard in order 
to obtain established goals (Perry, Mesch, and Paarlberg, 2006).  
 Performance-based compensation systems have been demonstrated to reduce th  amount 
of organizational discrimination due to inequities in pay. As Heywood and O’Halloran (2005, 
449) found, “evidence presented suggests that the racial wage differential is smaller for those 
receiving output pay. Output-based pay schemes provide more objective information on 
productivity than do typical supervisory evaluations.” Heywood and O’Halloran’s (2005) 
research is predicated upon the assumption that performance-based pay schemes remove 
subjectivity from decision making within individual systems. Each worker receives a predefined 
increase in pay for every new unit of productivity. This removes the often arbitrary nature of 
supervisor evaluations, thus reducing the amount of bias in the system. Moreover, this type of 
system makes discrimination more easily observed. The repercussions in the form of legal 
settlements, fines, and damage to an organization’s reputation make the cos  for discrimination 
high, lessening the chance of it actually occurring (Becker, 1971; Heywood and O’Halloran, 
2005). As observed, evaluations introduce bias and subjectivity into a system and often account, 
at least partially, for discrepancies between race and gender pay levels. 
The performance-based systems implemented by GAO, FDIC, and SEC have a 
methodological review process that deviates slightly from the resea ch performed by Heywood 
and O’Halloran, whose assumptions are based on the framework of tangible outputs. 
Unfortunately, most work produced by government agencies is of an intangible nature. 
Employees of federal agencies are frequently called upon to complete tasks that require mental, 
rather than physical, skills. Work produced might be in the form of reports or portions of reports, 
which makes assessing the output difficult and raises several questions. These questions include, 
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but are not limited to, the following: In a performance-based pay system, should a policy analyst 
be remunerated for the amount of reports authored in a given year? Does the total length of the 
reports matter? Should the quality of the reports be considered as well? Is the amount of impact 
that resulted from the reports important for consideration during evaluations? 
Attempting to take issues of fairness and objectivity into account throughout the 
evaluation process, the systems at GAO, SEC, and FDIC have internal mechanisms that 
discourage and remove discrimination. However, if bias were to occur, it should have a much 
larger impact on the affected employee than within the General Schedule, where s/he would be 
insured a yearly increase regardless of review. Because of this, Heywood and O’Halloran’s 
(2005) model must be revised for applicability in this study. Pay-for-performance systems within 
these agencies attempt to disambiguate and standardize the tasks of individuals within the 
organizations. However, the process is not as mechanical as for the public emp oyee as it is for 
the carpenter or sales person, who is paid an additional sum for each unit of output. All three 
systems rely upon evaluations from superiors to measure initial performance. It is virtually 
impossible to eliminate all forms of favoritism and subjectivity from performance reviews. 
Should the internal controls for removing bias be ineffective within these systems, the 
ability for discrimination to occur is much more likely. Elvira and Town (2001) found that 
workplace performance evaluations are highly dependent upon the race of the supervisor(s) and 
subordinate. Racial differences in pay discovered during their research are directly dependent 
upon the bias and subjectivity of the evaluator. When an evaluator is a different race than that of 
the employee being evaluated, the evaluator is much more likely to discount the employee on the 
basis of his or her race. The resulting lower score on the evaluation then directly impacts the 
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future pay of the employee. One can see from this study just how significantly race can impact 
evaluations.  
Additional studies have shown how wages in jobs traditionally filled by women pay 
much lower than sectors dominated by men (Bridges and Nelson, 1989). These disparities are 
attributable to a variety of contextual factors including sociological and economic elements. 
However, the study suggests that if the current trend to mirror government salaries to those 
within the private market continues, those roles in government that are similar to women-
dominated professions in the private sector could face suppressed wages. This is congruent with 
the observations of other research, which found that performance-based sy tems actually 
exacerbate this phenomenon (Elvira and Graham, 2002). Meyer observes that “a merit pay plan 
rests on the assumption that a supervisor can make objective and valid istinctions between the 
performances of various individual who report to him” (Meyer, 1975, 41). 
Evaluations of employees are, by their very nature, often highly subjective. Attempts 
have been made within the reformed agencies (GAO, FDIC, and SEC) to make the process as 
fair and scientific as possible, but it would be difficult to imagine a system where all bias was 
removed. Studies show that performance appraisals impact the efficacy of performance-based 
remuneration. When evaluations are unfair, or simply perceived to be so, the efficacy of the 
entire pay system can be undermined. Employees perception of the system is essential to 
building a successful program (Perry, Engbers, and Jun, 2009). To describe this more accurately, 
the General Schedule System is actually more like the output-based pay discussed by Heywood 
and O’Halloran (2005), due to its lack of ambiguity or the influence of supervisory subjectivity. 
From this perspective, this study’s first two hypotheses emerge. H1: Agencies that implement 
pay-for-performance reforms will have higher incident rates of discrimination. H2: Within the 
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experimental group, the pre-intervention means will be significantly lower than the post-
interventional means.  
The three agencies being reviewed have developed their pay system reforms 
autonomously. Ideas might have been gleaned from previous and existing projects, but each 
system was developed independently within the individual agency. The syst ms, developed as 
they were, have different banding systems, pay structures, and evaluation processes. Evaluation 
processes at SEC seem to be more focused on controlling bias than at GAO or FDIC. As 
previously mentioned, the SEC has a supervisor appraisal, followed by the employee being 
allowed to add his or her own argument to the evaluation, which is finally reviewed by a 
committee to ensure the supervisor’s findings were appropriate. GAOand FDIC also have 
systems in place to remove subjectivity from the evaluation process, but their systems are not as 
stringent as the process at the SEC. Given these observations, a third hypothesis becomes 
apparent. H3: Among the three agencies that have implemented performance-b sed pay reforms, 
post-intervention discrimination at SEC will be lower than at FDIC or GAO, due to the internal 
controls on bias during SEC employee evaluations. 
 
Methodology 
 Pursuant to the No FEAR Act of 2002, each federal agency is required to publish a yearly 
report that details the occurrences of discrimination within each organization. The data contained 
within these reports are useful for this analysis because they are uniformly collected information 
on the number of complaints alleging discrimination filed during a given year, the total number 
of complainants filing the grievances, the alleged basis upon which the discrimination occurred, 
the issue from which the complaint resulted, and the total number of actual findings of 
13 
 
discrimination as determined by agency investigation or adjudication. As such, the figures 
published by the agencies provide a means for undertaking a comprehensive comparative 
analysis of the agencies that have implemented pay-for-performance reforms and those that have 
not.  
In total, 12 agencies were included in the research, and each represents the study’s unit of 
analysis. GAO, SEC, and FDIC were the only three completely independent federal agencies 
meeting our size criterion that have implemented performance-based pay changes. Other quasi-
independent agencies, such as the Internal Revenue Service, have implemented similar changes, 
but were excluded from this analysis because they are within a larger federal department (IRS 
being a part of the Department of Treasury). It was determined that focusing on independent 
agencies, free of larger departmental cultures, would eliminate additional bias from the analysis. 
Excluding agencies with under 1,000 employees ensured that the agencies included in the 
evaluation were large enough to produce meaningful data. Numbers from small agencies, none 
of which had performance-based reforms implemented, would be of little contribution to the 
study. The other nine agencies included have not implemented remunerative reforms similar to 
GAO, SEC, or FDIC. As such, they serve as a control group for the analysis. See Appendix C for 
a listing of all agencies within the control group.  
Time-series analyses are used to describe and compare the tnds among both the control 
and experimental groups. Additionally, means analyses are utilized for more accurate and 
descriptive comparisons for testing the aforementioned hypotheses. Giv n the data available, this 
methodology allows for trends in EEOC complaints to be established before and after the 
independent variable’s introduction. Should a similar trend be found among all agencies within a 
particular group after the intervention is introduced, a compelling case might be made in support 
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of or against the aforementioned hypotheses. Additionally, by comparing the results found within 
the experimental group to those among the control group, the findings should be even more 
substantiated.  
The independent variable, performance-pay reforms, was tracked among the three 
agencies that made the changes and compared during those same years to the EEOC data for 
agencies that still use the General Schedule System. The dependent variable is the total number 
of complaints contained within each agency’s yearly publications on discrim nation (race, 
gender, age, religious affiliation, and all Title V protected classes). The data collected are 
thorough and allow for analysis of the same dependent variable across the experimental and 
control groups. Since all data collected were secondary in nature, no considerable ethical 
concerns arise.  
To make the numbers meaningful, the data collected by the agencies wer  converted to 
percentages based on the total number of employees within each agency for a given year. For 
example, if an agency had 100 complaints of discrimination during FY2006 and also had 1,000 
employees, the data collected were converted to represent this as 10 percent. Otherwise, 
comparing complaint levels from agencies with 1,000 employees to those with 10,000 would 
make very little sense. One hundred complaints during a year within a smaller agency would be 
much more significant than the same number within a tremendously larger o ganization. All 
numbers for employment for a fiscal year within each agency were taken from the database 
through the Office of Personnel Management’s website, also known as FedScope. The 
Government Accountability Office, an agency under the direct supervision of Congress, does not 
have data collected within the FedScope database on its yearly employment statistics. Because of 
this, alternative means were sought to indentify the numbers. The employment numbers for GAO 
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were taken from the Best Places to Work in the Federal Government, an annual study conducted 
by the Partnership for Public Service and the Institute of Public Poli y and Implementation at the 
School of Public Affairs at American University. These data did not include the employment 
numbers for GAO during FY 2007, however. This number was found within the 2007 GAO 
Performance and Accountability Report. 
 The pay-for-performance changes were implemented several years ago in all the agencies 
within the experimental group. The data, collected before and after the reforms, should provide a 
worthwhile analysis for assessing the changes in organizational discrimination amongst the 
groups and within the experimental group. To test the hypotheses, multiple measures were taken. 
Pre- and post-intervention means were compiled and examined for the experimental group, an 
analysis was performed of only the post-intervention means within the experimental group, and 
the post-intervention means for the experimental group were compared to the total means of the 
control group.  
All data among the agencies were collected and organized by fiscal year. This process, 
while being as thorough and complete as possible for each individual agency, does leave gaps in 
some areas of the data. Agencies began and ended collecting data at ifferent times. The Office 
of Personnel Management, for example, has the most extensive employment data available on 
the agencies, covering all years from 2000 to present. However, the Social Security 
Administration only has EEOC data published from 2006 to present. Most agencies began 
posting their No FEAR data in 2003, which provides a solid foundation for analysis, so any data 
lacking in the years after this should be relatively inconsequential to this study. The amount of 





 While the research produced a better understanding of the impact pay-for-performance 
reforms on organizational discrimination, a number of other, ancillary findings were discovered  
as well. To best understand the dynamics of the impacts, the discussion of the findings takes both 
standard time series and regression models into account.  
 Using an interrupted time series model (Appendix G), the impact of transitioning from a 
standardized pay system, like that of the General Schedule, to one that links performance with 
remuneration is clearly illustrated. In all three agencies within he experimental group, total 
EEOC claims alleging discriminatory treatment rose in the years immediately following the 
introduction of the performance-based pay reforms. For GAO and SEC, the increase in 
complaints filed was drastic, while the increase for FDIC wasonly mild. Nevertheless, all three 
agencies did experience an initial increase in EEOC complaint activity. 
 Once the policy had been established for a number of years, the number of EEOC 
complaints within all agencies had returned to levels similar to those before the policy 
intervention. In the case of FDIC, the number of EEOC complaints filed in 2008 was less than 
half of the pre-intervention total of FY2003. For the other two agencies, GAO and SEC, 
complaint levels two years after the initial introduction of the policy were at similar levels to the 
pre-intervention data.  
 The abrupt rises and declines around the policy intervention for the exp rimental 
agencies display a significant event. While other factors could have influ nced the data and 
caused a similar spike in complaint levels, it is unlikely that te same occurrence happened at all 
three agencies at exactly the necessary time to produce such a result. The policy interventions 
occurred during a different year for all three agencies, yet the same results are found amongst the 
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three agencies. Thus, it is highly improbably that the same unpredicted interruption occurred at 
each agency at the precise year needed to produce these results.  
 GAO had the largest single-year increase of the three agencies. Complaints within the 
agency rose almost 700 percent from FY2005 to FY2006. During FY2004 and FY2005, GAO 
had only received 5 total complaints alleging discrimination, or only 0.15 percent of all 
employees. By the end of FY2006, a full year into the pay-for-performance reforms, GAO faced 
35 complaints of discrimination, or 1.07 percent of its total workforce. By the end of FY2008, 
levels had settled around the pre-intervention levels.  
 The changes to remuneration policy at SEC occurred in 2003. The available data did not 
extend to data points prior to the policy intervention. However, if 2003 is con idered a baseline 
for the time series analysis, which is acceptable due to time lag, the findings display a significant 
increase in the reported number of EEOC claims in FY2004. Similar to GAO, the spike in the 
number of claims is immediately followed by an abrupt decline in subsequent years. Unlike 
GAO, the most recent observation points on the time line for SEC display complaint levels much 
lower than the pre-intervention totals.   
 FDIC implemented its pay-for-performance policy in 2004. The numbers of EEOC 
complaints within the agency rose from that time through FY2006, but not as dramatically as 
SEC or GAO levels. Following FY2006, the numbers had begun to decline, and by FY2008, 
numbers of complaints had dropped to 13, or 0.26 percent of the workforce. The most recent data 
point is less than half of the number of complaints filed immediately preceding the policy 
intervention. 
 The scope of the data available on GAO, FDIC, and SEC was limited, but not so much so 
as to impact the findings of the study. The No FEAR Act, which requi s the documentation and 
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publication of EEOC data, was passed in 2002. Almost all the 12 agencies i  the study had no 
data available prior to FY2003. The pay-for-performance reforms were implemented in 2003 at 
SEC, so the policy intervention and beginning of the analysis of EEOC data occurred 
contemporaneously. Thus, there is no way to ascertain the behavior of data prior to the 
introduction of the reforms. Luckily, however, the reforms only manifested in relevant data 
trends in the fiscal year following implementation. For practical purposes, the fiscal year in 
which the intervention occurred could be thought of as the last data point for the pre-intervention 
model. Once the policy to remunerate based on performance was established in any of the 
analyzed agencies, complaints did not begin to appear in the data until the fo lowing year due to 
the time the agencies’ processes take to undertake employee review and make ecisions affecting 
pay. 
 
The Perception of Discrimination 
 The dramatic changes in EEOC complaint activity directly following the policy 
intervention within the evaluated agencies initially suggest to the observer that pay-for-
performance programs do indeed impact the level of discrimination within an organization. 
However, when compared to the adjudicated levels of cases determined to actually be 
discrimination, a different picture emerges.  
 Actual findings of discrimination were rare among the three agencies in the experimental 
group. GAO had no findings of any discrimination during the entire period fm FY2003 
through FY 2008. Only one case of discrimination was discovered in the same time frame at 
FDIC. The case, adjudicated in FY2008, happened long after the initial itervention occurred. As 
such, it is difficult to establish if the pay-for-performance policy contributed in any manner to the 
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occurrence. At SEC, there was, again, only one finding of discrimination, which took place in 
2005. While this incidence happened in a time span close to the policy interve tion, it also arose 
as total complaints of discrimination within the agency were in a precipitous decline. The total 
number of adjudications of discrimination within the experimental group does n t constitute a 
significant finding that might indict the performance-based system  for elevating organizational 
levels of discrimination.  
 A more relevant and useful observation of this trend might focus les  on actual 
discrimination and more on perceived discrimination. That is, the spikes in complaint data with 
little to no corroborating data of actual discrimination suggest that employees within the 
organizations at least feel like they are being discriminated gainst. This in no way undermines 
the importance of understanding this trend; perceived injustice can be just as damaging to an 
agency as actual discrimination. A prudent public manager might find it wise to educate his or 
her organization extensively about the proposed changes and work closely with staff to tailor the 
plans precisely to the needs of the organization and expectations of employees.  
 
Comparing to the Control Group 
Comparing the rise in complaint activity of the experimental group t  the same data for 
the control group produced very interesting results. However, since the control group was not 
exposed to the intervening variable, a standard interrupted time series analysis is of little use 
when trying to compare the control and experimental groups. Instead, an independent samples  
t-test was employed to analyze the data. This method allowed for the first hypothesis (H1) to be 
tested. H1 hypothesized that agencies that did not implement pay-for-per mance reforms 
20 
 
would have lower levels of discrimination complaints.  
The results of the independent samples t-test entirely contradict the above hypothesis. For 
the comparison, only the post-intervention data from the experimental group was compared to 
the data from the control group. After completing the analysis, it was discovered that the mean of 
all EEOC complaints for the years following the policy intervention in the experimental group 
was lower than the complaint level for the control group.  
Since the significance of the Levene’s Test is 0.328, much larger than 0.05, the results of 
the t-test can be considered equivalent and included in the findings. The results show, however, 
that there is not a significant difference between the totals of the control and experimental 
groups. Assuming equal variances or not, the significance is above 0.1 for both groups (0.130 
assuming equal variances and 0.113 if not assuming equal variances). While the mean of the 
experimental group is lower than that of the control group, it is not significantly lower. That 
being the case, H1 must be rejected. The findings show no significant difference in the totals. 
There is no certainty that any significant difference in discrimination levels exists between the 
two groups. Statistically speaking, they are equivalent. Appendix B has the detailed statistics 
report for this finding. 
 
Analyzing the Experimental Group 
H2 hypothesized that the post-intervention means within the experimental group would 
be significantly higher than the pre-intervention means. A means analysis was again employed 
using an independent samples t-test. The difference of the means between the experimental and 
control groups was not significant. In two of the agencies, the post-intervention mean was higher 
(GAO and SEC). FDIC had a post-intervention mean that was 0.0000017 lower than pre-
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interventional mean. The post-interventional mean for SEC was slightly larger than the pre-
intervention mean. GAO, again having the most drastic change in complaint totals, had a post-
intervention mean that was more than three times the pre-interventional mean. 
Like the findings comparing the means of the experimental and control groups, none of 
the post-intervention means were statistically significant from pre-intervention means. GAO was 
the agency closest to the 0.05 significance level, with SEC and FDIC much further from 
significance. This being the case, H2 is rejected. The differenc  between the pre- and post-
intervention means for the experimental group is not significant. See App ndix C for more 
details on the results of the t-test results. 
H3 posited that SEC, due to the strict internal controls limiting subjectivity throughout 
the performance review process, would have the lowest rates of discrimination complaints after 
the intervening variable was introduced. To test this, means were again compared using an 
independent samples t-test (Appendix D). After reviewing the post-intervention means, SEC did 
indeed have the lowest level of discrimination complaints, with a me n of 0.0041445. FDIC had 
the highest mean of the group at 0.0064283. GAO had a post-intervention mean that was 
between the aforementioned agencies’ totals. The mean for GAO was closer to FDIC’s mean 
than SEC’s. Testing the difference of the means between SEC and the other agencies showed 
that the difference was not significant. H3 is rejected. The diff rence is not significant enough 
for the research to conclude that SEC’s means were significantly lower than GAO or FDIC.  
 
Conclusion  
 Pay-for-performance initiatives are gaining increasing levels of popularity at all levels of 
government. The findings from this research suggest that these reforms have had no short-term 
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effects on the levels of discrimination within the agencies that have implemented the changes. 
No positive or negative impact could be ascertained from the means analy es. The time-series 
analysis did produce evidence that would be of use to public administrator considering 
implementing pay-for-performance reforms.  
 This analysis created demonstrable evidence that actual discrimination should not be an 
impediment to agencies implementing pay system reforms. There were no significant changes in 
the number of discrimination complaints within the individual agencies’ pre- and post-
intervention totals. Additionally, the difference between the post-intervention mean of SEC 
(which had the lowest post-intervention mean) when compared to the means of GAO and FDIC 
was not significant. Finally, there was no statistically signif cant difference in the means of the 
experimental and control groups. Through testing for all three hypotheses, the evidence clearly 
indicates that no discernable connection exists, positive or negative, between pay-for-
performance reform and discrimination complaint levels.  
 
 Education, Outreach, and Compromise  
 While there was no evidence to suggest that pay system reform impacted individual 
agency discrimination levels in a positive or negative manner, there is evidence to suggest that 
employees initially perceive a negative impact. The time-serie  analysis displayed a common 
trend among all of the agencies within the experimental group. The trend, a sudden and 
precipitous increase in discrimination complaints in the first and second years following the 
introduction of the reforms, with no corroborating increases in adjudicate  cases of 
discrimination, suggests that employees perceive the system to be unfair and d scriminatory.  
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 After the first few years, this sudden increase in complaints drops back down to levels 
typical of what was observed prior to the reforms’ implementation. This quick decline of 
complaint levels indicates that as time passes and the employees become more accustomed to the 
new system, their apprehension toward it decreases. The decline in complaints could also be 
attributable to compromises reached between the agencies and the employees through 
negotiations. GAO employees attempted to unionize in the years following the reforms at the 
agency (Rutzick, 2007).  
 Administrators considering pay system reforms should be less concerned about actual 
discrimination and more interested in reaching out to the employees f their organizations prior 
to, during, and after the implementation of the changes. This is not to say that managers of public 
organizations should lose sight of the possibility of organizational discrimination. The possibility 
of this occurring remains in any and all systems, and should always be a continuing 
consideration. The findings of this research, however, suggest that if new pay systems are 
implemented correctly, discrimination should not be an impeding concern. More importantly, 
administrators considering the reforms should be focused on education, outreach, and 
compromise when implementing the reforms. 
 Before embarking upon any implementation of pay system reforms, administrators 
should have a well-planned program to present to the employees. Properly educating employees 
on the details of the changes should either garner their support or elicit feedback. Suggestions 
and comments provided by employees would need to be incorporated into the plans. As the 
process moves into implementation, employees need to be approached and again educated and 
listened to. The recursive nature of this process should provide both management and employees 
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with the knowledge of what is needed and a method of collaboration to produce a plan that 
accommodates most parties, thus reducing the initial shock of the changes. 
 
Call for Future Research 
 The push for federal pay reform to take a performance-based approach will ultimately 
have positive and negative implications. Many studies have already been conducted on the 
efficacy of these systems, spanning from the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 to the more 
contemporary approaches as part of President Bush’s Performance Agenda. There is a profound 
and recognizable need to analyze other repercussions that could theoretically result from such 
changes in remunerations systems. After all, increased efficacy and efficiency within the federal 
public service is an admirable goal to seek, but reaching this goal while jeopardizing the careers 
or remuneration of others is unacceptable.  
While the findings in this paper suggest that no connection between pay-for-performance 
reforms and discrimination exists, future research should seek to verify this finding within the 
different EEOC-protected classes. Total discrimination was the major dependent variable 
analyzed in this research. This is by no means, however, the only aspect that could be impacted 
by performance-based reforms, and even within this variable a more nuanced analysis should be 
undertaken in future research. The No FEAR Act of 2002 also requires agencies to report on 
specific categories of complaints, such as race, age, gender, national origin, and all other legally 
protected classes. Future research might find it useful to analyze these specific categories to 
establish a more detailed view of this topic. Where the data are v ilable, these same techniques 
might be usefully employed to evaluate these effects at lower levels of government as well.  
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In addition to testing within more EEOC related variables, future res archers may find it 
prudent to examine the effects pay systems reforms have on trust and morale within 
organizations. These studies could advance the field of knowledge on the evidenc  discovered in 
the time-series analysis utilized in this research, which suggested an initial perception of 
discrimination amongst the employees. Agencies with demoralized or untrusting employees 
might find decreased levels of productivity and heightened levels of turnover (Perry, Engbers, 
and Jun, 2009). 
The data used in this study contained a relatively short time frame for analysis. The No 
Fear Act was passed in 2002 and, as such, a dearth of data was available pr or to 2003, when 
most agencies began to comply with the provisions of the legislation. A few agencies, such as the 
Social Security Administration, whose data collection began in 2006, had even shorter time 
frames for reporting the data. As such, longer trends in discrimination complaint levels were not 
ascertainable. More testing will be needed to further corroborate the findings in this research. As 
time passes, more agencies will continue to comply with the No FEAR Act of 2002 and more 
data will become available to social scientists interested in this topic. As this occurs, the initial 
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goals. This, in 
turn, defines 
bonuses. 
Bands pay by level  Aligning salaries with 






rating system, based on 
employee competencies, to 
evaluate employee” 
Aligns pay of individual 
employees with those of 
private sector employees, 
based upon assessment of 
retained skills and education. 












and a committee 
review process to 
give bonuses. 
Aligning salaries with 
those of private 
markets through a 
committee review 
process that leads to 
bonus pay. 
Two-level rating system 
where performance is 
either acceptable or 
unacceptable. Second-
phase involves placing 
employees into one of four 
categories based on 
contributions. A committee 
will review evaluations and 
recommend a pay increase. 
 
Employees with 
“unacceptable” ratings will 
not receive a pay 
adjustment for the year. 
Aligns pay of individual 
employees with those of 
private sector employees, 
based upon assessment of 
retained skills and education. 




















Employees are assessed for 
initial competency. If a 
“meets expectations” rating 
is received, employee is 
placed into one of 4 pools 




considers productivity of 
peers. 
Aligns pay of individual 
employees with those of 
private sector employees, 
based upon assessment of 









Raises are usually 
linked to tenure 
within the service 
than to individual 
performance. 
15 grades or levels 







Employees receive a step 
each year, according to 
grade level. Program in 
place to allow transition to 
higher grades over time. 
Pay aligned with 
organizational hierarchy. Not 
highly responsive to market 
trends 





Testing H1: Independent Samples t-Test Comparing Experimental and Control Groups 
 
Group Statistics 
 Reforms N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Agencies Control Group 9 .007479000 .0022548916 .0007516305 




Independent Samples Test 
  Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
  







95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 

























 Reforms N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
FDICPREPOST Pre-Intervention 2 .0064300 .00052711 .00037273 
Post-Intervention 4 .0064283 .00257719 .00128859 
Independent Samples Test 
  Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
  







95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 














Appendix C Continued 
 
Testing H2: Independent Samples t-Test Experimental Group 
 
Group Statistics 
 Reforms N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
GAOPREPOST Pre-Intervention 3 .0019467 .00069051 .00039867 
Post-Intervention 3 .0059878 .00425015 .00245383 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
  Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
  







95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 





















Appendix C Continued 
 
Testing H2: Independent Samples t-Test Experimental Group 
 
Group Statistics 
 Reforms N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
SECPREPOST Pre-Intervention 1 .0039926 . . 
Post-Intervention 5 .0041445 .00145945 .00065268 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
  Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
  








95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
  Lower Upper 
SECPREPOST Equal variances 
assumed 























Post-Interventional Means N Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
SEC - FDIC SEC 5 .004144510 .0014594462 .0006526842 
FDIC 4 .006428282 .0025771865 .0012885932 
 
Independent Samples Test 
  Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
  
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) Mean Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 























Appendix D Continued 
 









Post-Interventional Means N Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
SEC - GAO SEC 
5 .004144510 .0014594462 .0006526842 
GAO 3 .005987793 .0042501507 .0024538256 
 
Independent Samples Test 
  Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
  
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) Mean Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
















Complaint Level Totals 
The categories listed below contain data on a single, and possibly the most descriptiv , 
variable. The “TOTAL” variable represents the actual number of EEOC complaints within the 
specified agency for a given fiscal year. To make the data more meaningful a d applicable across 
agencies of different sizes, the “TOTAL %” variable was created. This variable was calculated 
by dividing the total number of complaints by the total number of employees for that same fiscal 

















TOTAL %  
2003 9 0.27439% 33 0.60573% 13 0.39926% 
2004 5 0.15361% 36 0.68027% 25 0.65841% 
2005 5 0.15601% 33 0.71848% 17 0.43512% 
2006 35 1.07362% 38 0.83498% 13 0.36131% 
2007 15 0.46875% 35 0.75464% 11 0.31447% 













TOTAL %  
2000 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2001 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2002 N/A N/A 46 1.65706% N/A N/A 
2003 74 0.39106% 39 1.50696% 111 0.88060% 
2004 72 0.38760% 33 1.33874% 89 0.70652% 
2005 69 0.37504% 26 1.10030% 68 0.53687% 
2006 76 0.41648% 21 0.95672% 101 0.82991% 
2007 64 0.35375% 28 1.27737% 77 0.64188% 













TOTAL %  
2000 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2001 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2002 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2003 58 0.30533% N/A N/A 9 0.28635% 
2004 40 0.20749% 12 0.40282% 12 0.37221% 
2005 37 0.19696% 10 0.32862% 10 0.30349% 
2006 48 0.26006% 18 0.59642% 13 0.37228% 
2007 60 0.32501% 13 0.43874% 11 0.29333% 
2008 N/A N/A 10 0.31857% 13 0.31863% 
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TOTAL %  SSA TOTAL 
SSA  
TOTAL %  
2000 35 0.93909% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2001 38 1.06922% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2002 19 0.52026% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2003 28 0.78409% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2004 66 1.80921% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2005 54 1.05737% 40 0.92550% N/A N/A 
2006 36 0.68234% 38 0.60625% 394 0.61904% 
2007 32 0.55411% 34 0.75606% 402 0.64416% 
2008 19 0.32451% 40 0.82833% 466 0.72824% 
38 
 
Appendix F  
 
Means of Experimental and Control Groups 
 
Means - Control Group  
Mean                     
YEAR EEOC EPA GSA NARA NASA NRC OPM SBA SSA 
Yearly 
Average 
2000             .0093909     0.009391 
2001             .0106922     0.010692 
2002 .0165706           .0052026     0.010887 
2003 .0150696 .0039106 .0088060   .0030533 .0028635 .0078409     0.005935 
2004 .0133874 .0038760 .0070652 .0040282 .0020749 .0037221 .0180921     0.007464 
2005 .0110030 .0037504 .0053687 .0032862 .0019696 .0030349 .0105737 .0092550   0.006030 
2006 .0095672 .0041648 .0082991 .0059642 .0026006 .0037228 .0068234 .0060625 .0061904 0.005933 
2007 .0127737 .0035375 .0064188 .0043874 .0032501 .0029333 .0055411 .0075606 .0064416 0.005872 
2008 .0167800 .0040007   .0031857   .0031863 .0032451 .0082833 .0072824 0.005107 
Total .0135931 .0038733 .0071916 .0041704 .0025897 .0032438 .0086002 .0077903 .0066381 0.006410 
Means – Experimental Group 
Mean    
YEAR FDICTOTALPER GAOTOTALPER SECTOTALPER Yearly Average 
2003 .0060573 .0027439 .0039926 .0042646 
2004 .0068027 .0015361 .0065841 .0049743 
2005 .0071848 .0015601 .0043512 .0043654 
2006 .0083498 .0107362 .0036131 .0075664 
2007 .0075464 .0046875 .0031447 .0051262 
2008 .0026321 .0025397 .0030295 .0027338 
Total .0064289 .0039672 .0041192 .0048384 
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- Time Series Analysis of Individual Agencies  
